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Introduction
Today, it seems the Middle East is on the brink of another regional conflict, and it is possible that Western militaries may be forced to intervene in some way. Given the relevance to us all, in the near future we will take a look at a number of Middle Eastern air operations, from Australian forces fighting ISIS in Operation Okra, to Iranian sneak attacks on Iraqi bases in the 1980s. Today, we take a look at Operation Orchard, one of only two claimed raids on a nuclear facility.
Pretext
In 2001, it was reported that communications between North Korea and Syria were increasing. The situation was being monitored by a number of Israeli and US intelligence services. The Israeli Military Intelligence department, Aman, suggested that behind closed doors Syrian President Bashar Al Assad was discussing a potential nuclear arms trade. However, Mossad disagreed with this assessment, but neither could confirm or deny what exactly was going on.
In 2004, US intelligence also intercepted communications between Syria and North Korea, tracing these calls to a facility in the desert known as al-Kibar. This intelligence reached the Israelis, who took note of the location, handing over signals intelligence to the well-known Unit 8200 for monitoring. Investigations into this location were prioritised.
In 2006, it was reported that a high-ranking Syrian nuclear expert travelled under a false name to London. He was identified as the head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission, Ibrahim Ottman. Mossad had sent three teams to investigate. One trailed him as he went shopping, while another broke into his apartment when he was out. A computer expert on the team found his laptop, installed monitoring software, and took data to analyse.
Upon returning, the team found that the laptop contained hundreds of photos of the al-Kabir facility at different stages of production, including photos of Ibrahim Ottman with North Korean nuclear specialist Chon Chibu. Mossad had planned to assassinate Ottman there, but decided to spare his life. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was alerted to the situation, and the CIA was notified. Before long, US intelligence was monitoring the situation and a panel was set up to share information. It was now being claimed by Brigadier General Yaakov Amidror that this was indeed a nuclear facility under production, aided by North Korea.
Confirmation Mission August 2007
In August 2007, a mission was planned to confirm the nature of the site. A recon team from Sayeret Matkal, one of Israel's most elite special forces units, was tasked for the job. Two helicopters covertly ferried twelve soldiers into al-Kabir and the immediate area of the facility. Dressed in Syrian uniforms, they made their way to the facility and began collecting soil samples and taking photographs. As they got closer to the facility, they were spotted by Syrian forces and forced to pull back, and were extracted from the location.
The mission was still a success, with photos and samples of the site. The Israelis reviewed what they found and claimed that the samples and photos confirmed al-Kabir was a nuclear facility. Conversations between the US and Israel became tense. President George Bush was asked whether he would approve a US strike on the base, but the US was not convinced that this was indeed a nuclear site. Israel then said it would strike the base itself. The CIA feared this may start a regional war, while Mossad countered that if it was covert, they could convince Syria to accept the outcome of the strike without any public announcement. The controversial decision was made to go forward with a strike, with Israel alone on this mission.
Interestingly, it was claimed that US intelligence didn't pick up any unusual behaviour in regard to this site, because the Syrians ditched digital communications and used runners to deliver printed messages between high-ranking officers.
Mission Planning
There were two options on the table. The first was to send in a second team of special forces. They could place explosives on the facility and retreat. But this presented several problems: there was a high chance the team might be captured, a higher chance they would be detected beforehand, and once the explosions went off, the base would be on alert, making it difficult to extract the team. The biggest problem was that the building would likely need more explosives than the team could carry, and placement would prove extremely difficult.
The more viable option was an airstrike. It would be a fast, surprise attack, delivering the required payload, with virtually no risk of capture. This daring raid would require pilots with a high level of patience, precision, and calmness. The qualities the planners were looking for to secure a high chance of success are rare even among experienced pilots. However, there was one squadron up for the task.
Preparations
The IAF's 69th Squadron, known as the Hammers, had the support of Air Force leadership, and the task of striking this alleged nuclear reactor was assigned to them. Confidence in the squadron's success was high, as the Israeli Air Force had done this sort of mission before. Flying in close formation to mimic an airliner, four F-16s entered Iraqi airspace in 1981, struck a nuclear reactor under construction, and escaped. This was the only recorded strike on a nuclear facility in history, and the Israelis had confidence they could replicate this success.
In some ways this mission would be easier, as the Syrians did not possess the strength the Iraqis did in the 1980s, but in other ways it would be harder. The target was far in the north. Attempting to fly there directly through Syria would almost certainly result in detection, and given the distance, Syrian aircraft would easily guess where the Israelis were heading and move to safeguard the site.
Operations Begin Sept 3, 2007
On September 3rd, 2007, Israeli intelligence tracked a North Korean cargo ship entering port in Syria. It was thought that this ship was carrying nuclear fuel rods. The decision was then made to go ahead with the airstrike, which would take place on September 6. A number of aircraft would take part: several electronic intelligence aircraft to jam Syrian radar imagery, four F-15Is from 69 Squadron, and a group of over four F-16Is from 119 and 253 Squadrons. The F-15s would use laser-guided bombs, whilst the F-16s would use 500-pound bombs and AGM-65 Mavericks. The decision was supposedly also made to send in a small group of commandos near the base, who would laze the targets for the jets before they arrived, before being extracted.
As night set in on September 5th, 2007, the IAF aircraft took off and formed up for the strike, scheduled to take place just after midnight. The F-16s from Ramon Air Base would form up with the F-15s from Hatzerim. From there they would head west into the Mediterranean.
There were two paths they could have taken. They could have flown north along the coast of Lebanon, then crossed into Syrian airspace at an altitude of one hundred or so feet, flying directly across the desert, striking the base, then heading north into Turkish airspace, reaching the sea, then heading south and returning to base. The more likely path would be west, behind Cyprus, a longer route, then approaching from the north-west into Turkey, likely a far less suspicious route than flying along the Lebanese coast. They would then turn into Syria from the north, avoiding areas with heavy SAM coverage on the coast, strike the base, then follow the same path back through Turkey to the coast, and then head home.
The most important element here would be stealth. Neither the F-15 nor the F-16 had stealth capability, and the Syrians had advanced anti-aircraft hardware at their disposal. This is where advanced electronic warfare would play an important part of the mission. As the strike group was over the Mediterranean, the electronic intelligence aircraft managed to hide the incoming aircraft from Syrian radars. How they did this is still unclear. The most common explanation is that Gulfstream G550s, equipped with an advanced electronic warfare suite, escorted the aircraft. The F-15s may also have had electronic warfare capabilities.
It has also been claimed that the entire Syrian air defence system was hacked to ignore the enemy aircraft, using a BAE Systems program known as Suter 3. It is claimed this software allows the operator to see what enemy radars see, manipulate the system, alter images, and even invade links between missile systems and radar sites, all without detection. A third theory is that the Syrians were simply told to stand down when they saw the Israelis were heading for the reactor.
The Strike
The flight reached their turning point over the ocean, then headed east, passing over the coast into Turkish airspace. Continuing east, commandos were now on the ground some distance from Al-Kabir, preparing the laser for the strike. The strike aircraft continued eastwards, before diverting south towards the target. As they closed in, they readied weapons and lowered their altitude. Rapidly approaching the coordinates, the aircraft began locking onto the lazed target.
The F-16s fired their Mavericks at the site, followed by the release of their 500-pound bombs. Then the F-15s moved in behind, releasing their assortment of laser-guided bombs. The Mavericks struck the target, destroying parts of the infrastructure, followed shortly after by the other bombs lighting up the facility. During the chaos, the commandos extracted via a low-flying helicopter.
The base was now on high alert, although it was difficult to know exactly how effective the strike had been. The strike group turned around and began heading northeast towards Turkey. They now needed to escape the Syrian Air Force, which sent aircraft up to search for the intruders. It was unlikely that these older aircraft, with more archaic radars, would suffer the same digital attacks as the ground radars, so it was possible that the Syrian aircraft searching for the strike group could lock onto them.
Speeding up, the group successfully navigated into Turkish airspace over Gaziantep, where they jettisoned their external tanks and headed westwards towards the sea. All aircraft made it out, escaping into the Mediterranean, where they began the journey south towards home.
Post-Script
After returning, satellite imagery confirmed the results of the operation: it was a successful raid, with the facility in disarray. But it was not over yet, as some final negotiations were in play. Both Israel and Syria, ironically, had a mutual interest in keeping things quiet, or at least that is what Israel believed. To the Israelis, they had struck a potential nuclear reactor in a country they were technically not at war with. To Syria, they were, if the information was correct, engaged in building a nuclear facility in breach of international constraints. Both sides would suffer consequences if this information went mainstream.
Both countries went on high alert. Syria supposedly put long-range missiles armed with chemical warheads on high alert, which would act as their equivalent to the nuclear weapons they believed Israel had pointed at them. This standoff was not publicised, but Turkish media then reported that people were finding Israeli fuel tanks in Gaziantep. Israel sent a message to the Syrian government: they would not publicise what had happened, which would be a humiliating blow, so long as Syria also kept quiet. It appeared to work, and in the days that followed, the Syrians addressed reports of an attack by obfuscating, saying that Israeli aircraft were detected but were scared off. A year later, when publicly questioned, Al Assad said there was no such site.
For the next decade, reports remained mere speculation about the true nature of what happened. It was not until years later that confirmation and details of the attack were released, letting the world know that there had indeed been an aerial raid into Syria to strike what was purported to be a nuclear plant.