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The Mysterious Death of Ashraf Marwan
On July 1, 2007, relatives mourned Ashraf Marwan, the son-in-law of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Four days earlier, he mysteriously fell off the balcony of his luxury flat in London. Egypt’s president at the time, Hosni Mubarak, couldn’t attend the funeral as he was away at a summit, but he called Marwan “a true patriot of the country.” But privately, to many, Marwan was the greatest traitor in Egypt’s modern history. Because, for years, Ashraf Marwan was working for Mossad, Israel’s elite intelligence agency. He wasn’t just any agent; he was Mossad’s most valuable source. In the face of a great catastrophe in 1973, his warning may have helped save Israel from defeat.
Mossad’s Most Valuable Spy
Nasser never liked his son-in-law. Though Marwan’s pedigree was solid: his father was a major general, his grandfather the chief of Egypt’s Sharia courts, and he’d served as a chemist in the army, Nasser thought he was too opportunistic and loved luxury a little too much. Nasser’s daughter Mona insisted, and they married in July 1966. Soon after, Marwan went to London for a master’s in chemistry and slid into gambling debt so deep that a friend had to bail him out. Nasser was furious. And yanked him back to Cairo and parked him in the President’s office on the lowest salary under the watchful eye of his chief of staff, Sami Sharaf. For a man who craved wealth and status, it was humiliating.
Nasser’s Disapproval
Was it Nasser’s contempt that pushed him toward espionage? Or the thrill of the game? Either way, on one of his short study trips back to London… Marwan stepped into a red telephone box and called the Israeli embassy. He was ready to spy.
The Red Phone Call
He couldn’t get through on the first call. When he called again in late 1970, Major General Shmuel Eyal of the Israel Defense Forces picked up. Eyal insisted he come into the embassy for a chat, but Marwan refused. Their talk didn’t go anywhere. But then, chance intervened. When Eyal casually mentioned to two senior Mossad officers that an Arab by the name of “Ashraf Marwan” had volunteered his services, they were shocked. As detailed in The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel by author Uri Bar-Joseph: “Vardi, Goren, and the station chief all looked at one another. They knew the name well.” Mossad had been keeping tabs on Nasser’s son-in-law. They knew about the gambling. They knew he needed money. They knew he could be bought.
The First Meeting
Mossad arranged a first meeting at a London hotel. They sent their number two in the station, a fluent Arabic speaker known as Dubi. Dubi and Marwan clicked immediately. Marwan was charming and funny. And he didn’t come empty-handed. He brought a top-secret memorandum laying out Egypt’s entire military capabilities: units, locations, commanders, equipment, and readiness. Mossad gave him a code name: “The Angel,” after the 1960s TV series The Saint, which aired in Israel under that title. A man who was that close to Egypt’s inner circle felt like an answer to Israel’s prayers.
Nasser’s Death and Sadat’s Rise
By the time Marwan began spying for Mossad, Nasser was dead. Egypt’s crushing defeat in the Six-Day War haunted him and worsened his already frail health. Israel had seized the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria in six days. After Nasser’s death, Marwan quickly won over the new president, Anwar Sadat, once dismissed by Nasser as harmless. Sadat moved fast. In 1971, he purged Nasser’s old guard, and Marwan rose to become Sadat’s trusted advisor.
Sadat’s Plans to Reclaim Sinai
Early in 1971, Cairo’s aim was clear: to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula. But for the moment, Sadat didn’t think his army was ready, and Marwan passed that judgment to his Mossad handler, Dubi, reinforcing Israel’s assumption that Egypt would hold off. Israeli leaders believed Egypt wouldn’t dare attack until it had long-range fighter-bombers to counter the IAF’s F-4 Phantoms. Sadat had pinned his hopes on the MiG-23 jets, the hottest new long-range jets in the Soviet air force - but it hadn’t yet entered mass production.
Marwan’s Reports to Israel
Marwan’s reports went straight to the top: to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and IDF Chief of Staff Chaim Bar-Lev—without being diluted by layers of analysis. He relayed verbatim accounts of Sadat’s private talks with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, including Moscow’s pledge to supply “Kelt” air-to-surface missiles launched from Tu-16 bombers to strike targets deep inside Israel. Sadat trusted Marwan as his fixer, someone who could make deals happen. He covertly supplied Egypt with Mirage-5 fighters through Libya, as France refused to sell directly to Egypt or other parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He cashed in on his access, pocketing kickbacks on state deals, with one importer thanking him after a Mercedes order with a $1 million check. Despite racking up a personal fortune, he still took $10,000 every time he met with Mossad—evidence that he wasn’t in it just for the money, but the thrill.
Egypt’s Secret War Preparations
Egypt showed signs of preparing for war. In the summer of 1972, Sadat kicked out the Soviets, who had been defending Egyptian airspace, frustrated by Moscow's reluctance to support a war out of fear of provoking Washington. By June 1973, Marwan warned that Egypt would now go to war without waiting for long-range fighter-bombers. The plan was to cross the Suez Canal at 5 points with 5 infantry divisions, seize a shallow strip about 6 miles or 10 km deep, while being protected by Soviet-made air defense missiles. At the same time, Egypt’s ally, Syria, would attack from the north by the Golan Heights, forcing Israel to fight on two fronts. Cairo never told Damascus the advance would stop short, fearing Syria might refuse a limited plan. Egypt’s strategy was to create enough pressure to draw in Washington and force Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai Peninsula.
The Urgent 1973 Warning
On October 4, 1973, Marwan frantically phoned his handler Dubi and said he needed to see “the General” and talk about “lots of chemicals”. The “General” was Mossad’s director Zvi Zamir, and “chemicals” was their code for war. Marwan wasn’t alone at the time he placed the call, so had to be careful of what he said. Zamir was woken up at am with the urgent message. It was the day before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. Would Israel heed the warning?
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Golda Meir’s Critical Decision
Golda Meir faced a critical choice. She decided not to launch a preemptive strike to avoid appearing as the aggressor and to maintain U.S. support. She did, however, approve a reserve call-up. But the scale was limited due to skepticism within the high command. IDF chief David Elazar believed an attack was imminent, warning: “The message is authentic. For us, this is very short notice.” However, Israel’s military intelligence chief, Eli Zeira, clung to the belief that Egypt would NOT attack without long-range jets. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan agreed and even snapped: “You can’t call up the whole system just because of a few messages from Zvika.” the head of Mossad.
The Yom Kippur War Begins
As a result, Israel failed to fully mobilize its armored divisions before the assault began on October 6 at 2 pm. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal, overrunning Israel’s Bar-Lev line — a chain of fortifications along its eastern bank. Operation Badr Israeli tanks arrived uncoordinated and were overwhelmed by Egypt’s missiles. While fighting to hold the line in the south, Israel also had to defend the north, where Syrian forces stormed across the Golan Heights. Israeli reserves raced to the front, reaching Nafah, the main divisional command center, just in time to block a breakthrough and stabilize the line. In the following days, Israeli counterattacks drove Syrian forces back beyond the Golan Heights. While in the south, after days of brutal fighting, Israel crossed the Suez Canal into Egyptian territory, encircling Egypt’s Third Army. When the UN-backed ceasefire came into effect, Israel had lost a narrow strip of land on the east bank of the Suez Canal to Egypt, but gained territory west of the Canal and deep beyond the Golan Heights.
The Heavy Cost of Victory
The war came at a terrible cost: over 2,600 Israeli soldiers were killed. Egypt lost as many as 15,000 soldiers, and Syria around 3,000. Israel rewarded Marwan with $100,000 for his warning. And because of the last-minute scramble on Israel’s side, his cover wasn’t blown. After the war, Egypt shifted its focus toward diplomacy, aligning closer with the U.S. and distancing itself from the Soviet Union. The Camp David Accords (1978) laid the groundwork for peace, leading to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which officially ended decades of conflict. In exchange for Israel’s full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt agreed to a demilitarized Sinai monitored by international observers and ensured free navigation through vital waterways. Like Straits of Tiran
Marwan’s Later Years in London
In 1981, when Anwar Sadat was assassinated and Hosni Mubarak took the reins of power, Marwan relocated to London. He still passed political intelligence to Israel, though less often than before. But after an embarrassing meeting where his handler, Dubi, had hidden a cassette recorder that accidentally played their conversation aloud, their relationship effectively ended. By the early 2000s, rumors swirled of an Egyptian mole within Mossad. In 2002, Israeli-British historian Ahron Bregman publicly named Ashraf Marwan as the culprit. And in 2004, Israel’s military intelligence chief, Zeira, who was blamed for the Yom Kippur intelligence failure, appeared on Israeli TV, claiming Marwan was a double agent who delayed warning Israel until the last minute. Many saw this as Zeira’s attempt to shift blame from his own failures by casting doubt on Marwan’s reliability. When Mossad director Zamir accused Zeira of exposing Marwan, Zeira sued for libel and lost. In June 2007, a court ruling confirming Zeira’s leak of Marwan’s identity surfaced online.
“The Angel” is Exposed
Weeks later, on June 27, 2007, Marwan fell to his death from his fifth-floor London balcony. He was 63. That day, Marwan was scheduled to attend a board meeting across the street for Ubichem, a small chemical company in which he was the majority shareholder. The company’s CEO and a Board member witnessed his final moments on the balcony. As described in The Angel by Uri Bar-Joseph: “They saw him turn around in a way that appeared to the two of them, who knew him well, as unnatural. He lurched to the left and right, looking repeatedly over the guardrail, down to the ground below. … and then, to the utter horror of Shweiki and Parkhurst, he climbed up onto the rail and threw himself over.”
The Fall from the Balcony
Yet, another meeting participant who witnessed the aftermath saw two Middle Eastern-looking men on the balcony: “They did nothing, just looked down. Their calm was most unusual. A woman in the yard screamed, people ran to try and help out, or to call for help. But these two men just stood there.” Curiously, Marwan’s shoes, which might have held clues, were never found. Scotland Yard could not confirm the presence of the two men on the balcony, leaving the case unresolved.
Mubarak’s Denial and Mossad’s Tribute
Marwan’s death spared Egypt the embarrassment of publicly acknowledging that President Nasser’s son-in-law was an Israeli spy. Anwar Sadat’s family did not attend his funeral, despite their close ties to Marwan, hinting at underlying tensions. The Egyptian magazine Rose al-Yusuf later reported that President Mubarak personally ordered the hit, though Mubarak publicly insisted, “I do not doubt his loyalty.” Yet Mossad director Zvi Zamir insisted Marwan had been loyal only to Israel, hailing him as “the greatest source we have ever had.” If you’d like to discover the full story of the history of Mossad and how it operates to influence world events, watch my in-depth video on Mossad. The link is in the description Thanks for watching. For Newsthink, I’m Cindy Pom.